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SUMMARIES 
The aim of this article is to show that the dis- 
tinction "class as one - class as many" used by Ber- 
trand Russell and the similar Cantorian distinction be- 
tween konsistente and inkonsistente vielheiten have a 
history before modern set theory. To do so, the ex- 
ample of Thomas Vincentius Tosca (1651-1723, Valencia, 
Spain) is presented 111. This choice is rather arbi- 
trary and should not be construed as involving any 
claim of originality on his behalf. What is interest- 
ing about Tosca, however, is the combination he re- 
presents of theology, scholastic philosophy, and modern 
science, which gives particular weight to his endorse- 
ment of the distinction. 
Lo scope di quest0 articolo & di stabilire l'esist- 
enza, nella tradizione scolastica, della stessa idea 
the B. Russell ha esposto per mezzo della distinzione fra 
"class as one" e "class as many." Testi di Thomas Vin- 
centius Tosca (1651-1723) vengono citati come esempi the 
provano questa affermazione. 
Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist festzustellen, dass 
die Russellsche Unterscheidung zwischen "class as one" 
und "class as many" schon eine Vorgeschichte in der 
Scholastik hat. Als Beispiel dieser Vorgeschichte 
werden einige Texte von Thomas Vincentius Tosca (1651- 
1723) zitiert. 
INTRODUCTION 
Readers are often introduced to the mysteries of set theory 
through Russell's contradiction or similar paradoxes. The 
novice is asked to consider the class of men, the class of books 
in his library, etc. Next he is asked to realize that none of 
these objects (classes) is, respectively, a man, a book from 
his library, etc., or, equivalently, that none of them is a 
class that is a member of itself. The next step is to invite 
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the reader to consider the class of classes that are not members 
of themselves. The existence of this new object seems guaranteed 
for the same reason that secures the existence of the class of 
men or of the class of books in the library, namely, that if the 
elements exist, then also the class of such elements exists. 
At this point the surprise arrives by means of an elementary 
truth of logic. This may be expressed by the valid formula 
TVX Ay . R xy * -I Ryy l , 
which may be read as follows: "there is not an x such that for 
every y,x stands in relation R to y, if and only if it is not 
the case that y stands in relation R to y." Thus the novice 
learns to his amazement that the class of classes that are not 
members of themselves does not exist. 
From here on, authors become so busy with determining which 
sets exist and which sets do not exist (axiomatically, type- 
theoretically, constructively, or otherwise) that they usually 
forget to comment on the strangest aspect of these initiation 
ceremonies, namely, that some sets are declared to he nonexistent 
although each of their elements is allowed to exist. 
Cantor and Russell were sensitive to this ultimate paradox, 
and they tried to grasp it by the "class as one-class as many" 
(or konsistente-inkonsistente) distinction [Russell 1903; Cantor 
1932, esp. p. 4433. As Russell points out in a letter to his 
friend Phillip Jourdain, many x's satisfy x - E x, but there 
is no such entity as x' (x - E x) ("the class of x's such that 
x is not a member of x"). Each of the elements exists: The 
error lies in supposing that they combine to form a new entity 
[Grattan-Guinness 1977, 681. 
What are classes as many? Russell's answer is that they 
are "nothing" - they are not entities [Grattan-Guinness 1977, 
781. This is not quite convincing: One still feels that even 
"as many" a class is an entity of some sort. For our purposes, 
however, we may leave aside these ontological considerations 
and point out that the "class as one-class as many" distinction, 
in spite of being usually regarded today (if known at all) as 
a historical relic, has played a useful role, and can still be 
recognized, in the major developments of modern set theory. 
To begin with, Russell's own "no class" theory of Principia 
Mathematics is a result of his decision to view each class only 
as many [2]. As a matter of fact, this helps us to make some 
sense of the theory. Needless to emphasize, the distinction 
between set and class agrees very much with the intuitions under- 
lying the distinction "as one-as many." Quine's real vs.virtual 
classes and Lorenzen's definite vaindefinite Menge point in 
the same direction [Quine 1963; Lorenzen 1965, esp. 5 41. 
All of this increases the interest in finding the same dis- 
tinction in the philosophical tradition before modern set theory. 
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Let us now see how neatly the distinction appears in our chosen 
theologian-mathematician, Thomas Vincentius Tosca. 
Tosca defends the traditional view that except for God there 
cannot be any actual infinity; in particular there cannot be any 
actual infinity secundum multitudinem, i.e., and infinite set 
in actu [Tosca 1754, tomus secundus, liberx: "De Infinito" 295- 
3161. The latter repugnat: It is impossible (Propositio VII). 
Consider now the class P of all possible entities. It might 
appear that God can make P fully actual (text 2) or at least that 
God can see the class P as a whole (text 3). Insofar as P is 
infinite (text 2,3) these remarks would suggest that an infinite 
set in actu is, after all, not that impossible. Out author, how- 
ever, insists that it is impossible, hence P cannot exist, hence 
God cannot create it or even see it. At the same time, it must be 
admitted that each element of P can be created and can be seen by 
God. At this point, Tosca introduces the distinction between a set 
considered collective (collectively) and distributive (distribu- 
tively). The class P does not exist collective, it exists only 
distributive. God has to content himself with dealing with P 
only in the second sense, i.e., as many. It is rather impres- 
sive to learn this from a man who was "un habile mathematicien 
et un theologien profond" [Biographie universelle 8, 1850, 1791. 
Tosca does not seem to specify whether the elements of P 
are just individually possible (i.e., each of them taken singly 
is possible) or also jointly possible, that is, "compossible" 
as well. This is, however, irrelevant for his purposes: Even 
if P is "cornpossible," it cannot be actualized because there 
cannot be an infinity in actu. 
TOSCA ON INFINITY: THREE EXCERPTS FROM HIS CHAPTER "DE INFINIT0"[3] 
1. Dices cum aliquibus: potest Deus producere omnes 
creaturas possibiles: sed numerus creaturarum pos- 
sibilium est maximus; non enim potest alius esse major, 
cum omnia possibilia comprehendat: ergo dari potest 
numerus omnium maximus. Sed respondeo majorem esse 
falsam in sensu collective: licet enim possit a Deo 
produci omnis creatura possibilis distributive, id 
est, haec et haec: atque ita non tot, quin plures; 
non tamen produci potest collective. Instabis omne 
possibile collective potest produci collective: ergo 
falsa est nostra solutio. Sed respondeo nullam esse 
totalem collectionem rerum possibilium: unde si omnia 
possibilia collective sumantur, sunt impossibilia: 
verum de his iterum postea. 
2. Objicies 1. Potest Deus producere collectionem 
omnium creaturarum possibilium: sed talis collectio 
esset actu, et cathegorematice quoad numerum infinita: 
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ergo potest dari numerus actu infinitus. Major prob. 
nam collectio omnium creaturarum possibilium nullum 
includit impossibile: ergo est possibilis; et con- 
sequenter potest Deus illam actu producere. Resp. 
negans majorem. Ad ejus probationem distinguo ante- 
ted. Nullum includit impossibile pro materiali; id 
est omnes creaturas in eo contentae sunt possibiles, 
concede: nullum includit impossibile pro formali, 
seu quatenus collectio est, aut numerus infinitus, 
nego: importat enim ea impossibilia, quae supra 
adduximus: quod nempe numerus ille major esset, 
et minor se ipso: aequalis et inaequalis, etc. Sed 
instas, Deus potest ponere in actu quidquid potest: 
sed Deus potest omnia possibilia: ergo potest ponere 
in actu omnia possibilia: sed haec sunt infinita: 
ergo potest ponere in actu infinita. Resp. distin- 
guens majorem, Deus potest ponere in actu collective 
quidquid potest, nego; distributive, concede. Simi- 
liter distinguo min. Deus potest omnia possibilia, 
distributive, concede; collective, nego: et con- 
sequentiam. Potest itaque Deus ponere possibilia, 
eaque sine termino, distributive tantum; id est, 
potest ponere in actu plura, et plura, et numquam 
tot, quin plura; non tamen potest ea ponere, aut 
producere collective; ita ut tota collectio dici 
possit producta. 
3. Objicies 2. Deus videt simul, seu collective 
omnia possibilia: ergo omnia possibilia sunt de 
facto in actu objective; sed sunt infinita: ergo 
datur infinitum in actu saltim objective. Resp. 
distinguens maj. Deus videt simul, seu collective 
omnia possibilia, illa simultate appellante supra 
possibilia; id est, videt omnia collective possi- 
bilia, nego: sic enim, ut dixi, sunt impossibilia: 
videt simul omnia possibilia simultate appellante 
supra Deum; id est, Deus simul illa possibilia 
videt seu non unum post aliud, concede. Et dis- 
tinguo conseq. Omnia possibilia sunt de facto in 
actu objective collective, nego; distributive, 
concede: et nego consequentiam. Deus itaque videt 
simul, id est, unico simplici intuitu omnia possi- 
bilia, eo tamen modo, quo sunt possibilia: cumque 
omnia non sint possibilia collective, seu non possint 
omnia existere simul, ideo net videt Deus omnia col- 
lective possibilia: videt tamen simplici intuitu 
illa omnia infinita distributive; id est, videt non 
tot posse existere, quin plura, et plura sine fine 
existere possint: videt itaque infinitum potentia, 
HM6 Before Modern Set Theory 309 
cum finito semper actu: aut finitum semper actu, cum 
infinito potentia. 
I would like to add the following remark. There is an im- 
pressive similarity between Tosca's way of referring to the 
fact that a class is accessible only distributive and Kamke's 
comments on the "Menge K aller Kardinalzahlen" [Kamke 1962, 491. 
In text 1 Tosca says that God can produce every possible creature 
distributively, i.e., haec et haec; Kamke, who regards K as ein 
sinnloser Begriff, says that "bei der Menge K kann man [...I 
dieses oder jenes Element bilden - man braucht dafir nur diese 
oder jene Menge zu wshlen. . ..'I The parallelism between Tosca's 
Latin "haec et haec" and Kamke's German "dieses oder jenes" is 
striking. 
NOTES 
1. There are many bio-bibliographical references in the first 
volume of Tosca 117541. I owe to Albert C. Lewis the references 
for Crespo Pereira [1953], a paper on Tosca as a mathematician, 
and for notice of a brief article on Tosca in the Biographie 
universelle, Vol. 8, 1850, 179. 
2. Grattan-Guinness 1977, 68, quoting Bertrand Russell from 
a letter to Jourdain of Jan. 1 1906; the all is emphasized by 
Russell: "I think it is demonstrable that inconsistent classes 
are not classes or anything else, but are merely mistakes. I 
now extend this to all classes." 
3. Each passage is taken from Tosca 1754, Vol. 2, as follows: 
text 1: p. 301; text 2: p. 311, text 3: p. 312. 
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